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In the paper [Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331(2002)], an entanglement-based quantum key distribution
protocol for d-level systems was proposed. However, in this Comment, it is shown that this protocol
is insecure for a special attack strategy.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.65.-w, 03.65.Ud
In the paper [1], V. Kariminpour et al. presented a
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol for d-level sys-
tems based on shared entanglement of a reusable Bell
state. The security against some individual attacks is
proved, where the information gain of Eve is zero and
the QBER introduced by her intervention is (d − 1)/d.
However, in this paper we will show that, by a special
attack strategy Eve can get about half of the key dits
without being detected by Alice and Bob.
For convenience, we use the same notations as in
Ref.[1]. Let us give a brief description of the QKD proto-
col firstly (see Fig. 1). At the beginning, Alice and Bob
share a generalized Bell state
|Ψ00〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j〉a,b. (1)
Denote the i-th key dit to be sent by qi, which is encoded
as a basis state |qi〉k. To send the key dit qi to Bob,
Alice performs a controlled-right shift on |qi〉k and thus
entangles this qudit to the previously shared Bell state.
Then she transmits this qudit to Bob, from which Bob
can obtain the key dit qi by performing a controlled-left
shift and a measurement on it. Because every sending
qudit is in a completely mixed state, Eve can not extract
information about the key. Furthermore, to strengthen
the security of this protocol, Alice and Bob perform H⊗
H∗ on their Bell states before encrypt each |qi〉k.
We will describe Eve’s strategy separately for each qu-
dit. Hereafter we use the term “the i-th round” to denote
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FIG. 1: The QKD protocol. Note that in this Comment,
for simplicity, the operation H ⊗ H∗ or H ⊗ H∗ ⊗ H is not
included in our figures.
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FIG. 2: Eve’s attack in the first round.
the processing procedures of the i-th qudit, and Alice
and Bob’s operation H⊗H∗ is taken as the beginning of
each round. In addition, we use |ψi0〉a,b,e and |ψi1〉a,b,e
to denote the states shared by Alice, Bob and Eve in the
beginning and the end of the i-th round, respectively.
Suppose Eve prepares |0〉 as her ancilla, the eavesdrop-
ping strategy can be described as follows:
(i) In the first round, Eve entangles her ancilla into the
Bell state shared by Alice and Bob. More specifically, Eve
intercepts the sending qudit and performs a controlled-
right shift on her ancilla, then resends the sending qudit
to Bob (see Fig. 2). The initial state of Alice, Bob and
Eve’s particles can be represented as
|ψ10〉a,b,e = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, 0〉a,b,e. (2)
Then the states at various stages in Fig. 2 are as follows:
|Φ0〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, q1, 0〉a,b,k,e, (3)
|Φ1〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, j + q1, 0〉a,b,k,e, (4)
|Φ2〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, j + q1, j + q1〉a,b,k,e, (5)
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FIG. 3: Eve’s attack in the second round.
|Φ3〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, q1, j + q1〉a,b,k,e. (6)
In the last stage, when Bob performs his controlled-left
shift, he disentangles the key qudit |q1〉k and correctly
gets the value of q1, while the original Bell state has now
been entangled with the state of Eve in the form of
|ψ11〉a,b,e = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, j + q1〉a,b,e. (7)
(ii) In the second round, Eve tries to avoid the detec-
tion and, at the same time, retain her entanglement with
Alice and Bob. As was proved in Ref.[1], Eve can not
obtain information in this round. However, we will show
that she can take some measures to avoid the detection.
Firstly, when Alice and Bob perform the operations
H ⊗ H∗ on their “Bell state”, Eve also performs H on
her ancilla. As a result, the entangled state of Alice, Bob
and Eve will be converted into
|ψ20〉a,b,e = H ⊗H∗ ⊗H |ψ11〉a,b,e
=
1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
H ⊗H∗ ⊗H |j, j, j + q1〉a,b,e
=
1
d2
d−1∑
j,k,l,m=0
ζjk−jl+m(j+q1)|k, l,m〉a,b,e.(8)
Summing over j and using the identity 1
d
∑d−1
j=0 ζ
jn =
δ(n, 0), we finally arrive at
|ψ20〉a,b,e = 1
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
ζq1(l−k)|k, l, l− k〉a,b,e. (9)
Afterwards, Eve intercepts the sending qudit, performs
a controlled-right shift on it, and then resends it to Bob
(see Fig. 3). The states at various stages in Fig. 3 are as
follows:
|Ψ0〉 = 1
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
ζq1(l−k)|k, l, q2, l − k〉a,b,k,e, (10)
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FIG. 4: Eve’s attack in the third round.
|Ψ1〉 = 1
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
ζq1(l−k)|k, l, k + q2, l− k〉a,b,k,e, (11)
|Ψ2〉 = 1
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
ζq1(l−k)|k, l, l+ q2, l − k〉a,b,k,e, (12)
|Ψ3〉 = 1
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
ζq1(l−k)|k, l, q2, l − k〉a,b,k,e. (13)
In the last stage, when Bob performs his controlled-left
shift, he disentangles the key qudit |q2〉k and correctly
gets the value of q2, while leaving the state
|ψ21〉a,b,e = 1
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
ζq1(l−k)|k, l, l− k〉a,b,e. (14)
(iii) In the third round, Eve eavesdrops the key qu-
dit. Firstly, as in step.(ii), Eve also performs H on her
ancilla when Alice and Bob perform H and H∗ on their
respective particles. The entangled state will be changed
into
|ψ30〉a,b,e = H ⊗H∗ ⊗H |ψ21〉a,b,e
=
1√
d
d−1∑
m=0
|m,m,m− q1〉a,b,e. (15)
Afterwards, Eve intercepts the sending qudit, performs
a controlled-left shift, a measurement and a controlled-
right shift on it, and then resends it to Bob (see Fig. 4).
The states at various stages in Fig. 4 are as follows:
|Ω0〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
m=0
|m,m, q3,m− q1〉a,b,k,e, (16)
|Ω1〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
m=0
|m,m,m+ q3,m− q1〉a,b,k,e, (17)
|Ω2〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
m=0
|m,m, q3 + q1,m− q1〉a,b,k,e, (18)
|Ω3〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
m=0
|m,m,m+ q3,m− q1〉a,b,k,e, (19)
3|Ω4〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
m=0
|m,m, q3,m− q1〉a,b,k,e. (20)
It can be seen that Eve disentangles the key qudit by a
controlled-left shift, performs a measurement, and then
restores the entangled state by a controlled-right shift.
As a result, Eve obtains the measurement result q3 +
q1 and Bob correctly gets the value of q3. At last, the
entangled state of Alice, Bob and Eve can be written as
|ψ31〉a,b,e = 1√
d
d−1∑
m=0
|m,m,m− q1〉a,b,e. (21)
(iv) In the fourth round, Eve uses the same strategy as
in the second round to avoid the detection, that is, the
strategy in step.(ii). After their operation H ⊗H∗ ⊗H ,
Alice, Bob and Eve change the entangled state into
|ψ40〉a,b,e = H ⊗H∗ ⊗H |ψ31〉a,b,e
=
1
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
ζ−q1(l−k)|k, l, l− k〉a,b,e. (22)
Then Eve performs the operations as described in
Fig. 3. The states at various stages are as follows:
|Θ0〉 = 1
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
ζ−q1(l−k)|k, l, q4, l− k〉a,b,k,e, (23)
|Θ1〉 = 1
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
ζ−q1(l−k)|k, l, k + q4, l − k〉a,b,k,e,(24)
|Θ2〉 = 1
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
ζ−q1(l−k)|k, l, l+ q4, l − k〉a,b,k,e, (25)
|Θ3〉 = 1
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
ζ−q1(l−k)|k, l, q4, l− k〉a,b,k,e, (26)
where Θp corresponds to the state Ψp in Fig. 3 (p =
0, 1, 2, 3).
It can be seen that, in the last stage, Bob correctly
gets the value of q4, while leaving the state
|ψ41〉a,b,e = 1
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
ζ−q1(l−k)|k, l, l− k〉a,b,e. (27)
(v) In the fifth round, Eve uses the same strategy as in
the third round to eavesdrop the key qudit, that is, the
strategy in step.(iii). After their operation H ⊗H∗⊗H ,
Alice, Bob and Eve change the entangled state into
|ψ50〉a,b,e = H ⊗H∗ ⊗H |ψ41〉a,b,e
=
1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, j + q1〉a,b,e. (28)
Then Eve performs the operations as described in
Fig. 4. The states at various stages are as follows:
|Υ0〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, q5, j + q1〉a,b,k,e, (29)
|Υ1〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, j + q5, j + q1〉a,b,k,e, (30)
|Υ2〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, q5 − q1, j + q1〉a,b,k,e, (31)
|Υ3〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, j + q5, j + q1〉a,b,k,e, (32)
|Υ4〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, q5, j + q1〉a,b,k,e, (33)
where Υp corresponds to the state Ωp in Fig. 4 (p =
0, 1, 2, 3, 4). It can be seen that Eve’s measurement result
in this round is q5 − q1.
Obviously, in the last stage, Bob correctly gets the
value of q5, while leaving the state
|ψ51〉a,b,e = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, j + q1〉a,b,e. (34)
Note that |ψ51〉a,b,e = |ψ11〉a,b,e. Therefore, in the fol-
lowing rounds, Eve can use the same strategy as in the
steps from (ii) to (v) repeatedly until the last key dit
were transmitted.
Now let us give a concretely description of our eaves-
dropping strategy:
1. In the first round, Eve performs the operations as
described in Fig. 2;
2. When Alice and Bob perform H and H∗ on their
respective particles at the beginning of every round
(except for the first round), Eve also performs H
on her ancilla;
3. In every even round, Eve performs the operations
as described in Fig. 3;
4. In every odd round (except for the first round), Eve
performs the operations as described in Fig. 4.
From the above analysis, we can see that in our eaves-
dropping strategy no error will be introduced to the key
distribution between Alice and Bob, and Eve will obtain
exactly the result of
q3 + q1, q5 − q1, q7 + q1, q9 − q1, . . .
from which she can infer about half of the key dits by
checking d possible values for q1. It should be empha-
sized that there is another profitable fact for Eve. That
is, at the end of QKD procedure, Alice and Bob will
4compare a subsequence of the key dits publicly to detect
eavesdropping, which will leak useful information to Eve.
More specifically, as long as any odd numbered key dit
is announced, Eve can determine which of the d possible
results is true.
In conclusion, though Eve cannot get information
about the key dit in every even rounds (as proved in
Ref.[1]), she can take some more clever measures to avoid
the detection and retain her entanglement with Alice and
Bob, so that she can eavesdrop the key dit in the next
round. Our attack strategy is exactly based on this fact.
By our strategy Eve can obtain about half of the key dits
without being detected by Alice and Bob. Consequently
the QKD protocol in Ref.[1] is insecure against this type
of attack.
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